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Corporate Strategy – Page 4 – Strategy @ Risk

Category: Corporate Strategy

  • Investment analysis

    Investment analysis

    This type of  analysis gives the client direct information regarding the investments profitability, and its influence on company value.

    An important part of the investment analysis is cost. Especially in complex and demanding projects, there is significant risk related to investing. We have developed a method that clearly assesses and explains the relationship between uncertainty raised by each cost element, and which effect it has on the investment’s total risk.

    In a complex project there is often a set of cost elements that triggers follow-up costs. If one cost element exceed budget, the total cost increase can be significant, even though the isolated increase in the original cost element seemed small.

    We have focused on visualizing for the client, the scope of uncertainty in the investment, and which probability distributions that exist for each single cost element overstep.

    We focus especially on those cost elements that should be subject to strong control and follow-up. Such that the likelihood for excess cost can be reduced.

    We see it as crucial that the client has solid analysis describing and explaining the possible total cost outcomes, and their probability distributions at time of decision. With this method and these results the client can discuss the premises for the investment and decide whether or not carry out the investment with the revealed uncertainties.

    Below we present three graphs that shows the sensitivity in a project related to changes in demand for return on capital. For all three graphs the reference point is set in the projects IRR which is the point where the projects discounted revenues equal the value of the projects discounted cost payments (Project inflow/outflow ratio = 1).

    inflow_outflow-ratio1

    The curves are ideal for comparing investments with different profiles. When the X-axes is equal, curves for different projects can be overlapped to give information on whether one project is better than the other.

    payback1

    It is also possible to estimate the probability distribution for the projects net present value, or its effect on the distribution of company value.

    value-of-investment

  • The Probability of Gain and Loss

    The Probability of Gain and Loss

    Every item written into a firm’s profit and loss account and its balance sheet is a stochastic variable with a probability distribution derived from probability distributions for each factor of production. Using this approach we are able to derive a probability distribution for any measure used in valuing companies and in evaluating strategic investment decisions. Indeed, using this evaluation approach we are able to calculate expected gain, loss and their probability when investing in a company where the capitalized value (price) is known.

    For a closer study, please download Corporate-risk-analysis.

    The Probability Distribution for the Value of Equity

    The simulation creates frequency and cumulative probability distributions as shown in the figure below.

    value-of-equity

    We can use the information contained in the figure to calculate the risk of investing in the company for different levels of the company’s market capitalization. The expected value of the company is 10.35 read from the intersection between probability curve and a line drawn from the 50% probability point on the left Y-axis.

    The Probability Distribution for Gain and Loss

    The shape of the probability curve provides concise information concerning uncertainty in calculating expected values of equity. Uncertainty is probability-of-gainreduced the steeper the probability curve, whereas the flatter the curve so uncertainty is more evident. The figures below depicts the value of this type of information enabling calculation of expected gains or losses from investments in a company for differing levels of market capitalization.

    We have calculated expected Gain or Loss as the difference between expected values of equity and the market capitalization; the ‘S’ curve in the graph shows this. The X-axis gives different levels of market capitalization; the right Y-axis gives the expected gain (loss) and the left y-axis the probability. Drawing a line from the 50% probability point to the probability curve and further to the right Y-axis point to the position where the expected gain (loss) is zero. At this point there is a 50/50 chance of realising or loosing money through investing in the company capitalized at 10.35, which is exactly the expected value of the company’s equity.

    To the left of this point is the investment area. The green lines indicate a situation where the company is capitalized at 5.00 indicating an expected gain of 5.35 or more with a probability of 59% (100%-41%).

    probability-of-loss1

    The figure to the right describes a situation where a company is capitalized above the expected value.

    To the right is the speculative area where an industrial investor, with perhaps synergistic possibilities, could reasonably argue a valid case when paying a price higher than expected value. The red line in the figure indicates a situation where the company is capitalized at 25.00 – giving a loss of 14.65 or more with 78% probability.

    To a financial investor it is obviously the left part – the investment area – that is of interest. It is this area that expected gain is higher than expected loss.

  • The Value of Quality Management

    The Value of Quality Management

    Warret Buffett is recognized being one of the worlds most successful investor. What are the key issues when deciding to invest? Some of the most relevant factors are written here. If you want the source himself, please go to Warren Buffett here.

    Managing the Buffett way
    By Stuart Crainer

    The naive figure who utters profound truths holds a perennial and universal appeal. The naïf who succeeds and mysteriously makes sense of an alien environment is the subject of movie after movie – from Peter Sellers’ Being There to Tom Hanks’ Big.

    Something of the same phenomenon can be seen in the business world. Ben and Jerry fascinate because they appear so blithely straightforward and enthusiastic. Sir Richard Branson remains immune to criticism despite Virgin’s occasional misadventures. He is an engaging innocent, an enthusiast in a woolly jumper. There is a sense that these people are from a different time, an era of decency and simple pleasures. They are idiosyncratic throwbacks to bygone ways of doing business, cavaliers in an age of roundheads.

    The investor Warren Buffett is part of this phenomenon. He successfully ignored the new economy bubble and emerged to tell a tale of even greater riches. The Sage of Omaha has been enormously successful in a field where competition is ruthless. As you’d expect, Buffett’s achievement has been examined from every angle. Yet, if emulation is a measure of understanding, it appears little understood.

    Buffett, a man of resolutely simple tastes, someone who oozes old-fashioned decency from every pore, stands above the maelstrom of analysts, commentators, and private investors. As he has become more famous and his investment company Berkshire Hathaway ever more successful, Buffett’s public utterances and writings have become more playful.

    As happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise do in the beginning, fools do in the end,” he wrote in 1989. This was followed in 1990 by: “Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style”. Of all the markets he has conquered, the one in homespun wisdom may be his surprising legacy.

    Investors buy books on the great man in their millions (there is a book called Buffettology though the most useful is The Essays of Warren Buffett) and pore through them in search of a formulaic approach to investing. They will, of course, be disappointed. It is not that Buffett does not have a formula. He does.

    Buffett advocates “focused investing”. When gauging the wisdom of an investment, investors should look at five features:

    1. The certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated.
    2. The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows.
    3. The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the reward from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself.
    4. The purchase price of the business.
    5. The levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced and that will determine the degree by which an investor’s purchasing-power return is reduced from his gross return.

    Buffett admits that many will find such criteria “unbearably fuzzy”. This is only partly the case. Analysis can lead to conclusions about the long-term economic prospects of a business. Analysis can also establish what is a reasonable purchase price and help predict future macroeconomic conditions likely to impact on the investment. Where analysis falls down and things do begin to become fuzzy is in assessing the incumbent management.

    Time and time again in his wry annual letters to shareholders, Buffett returns to the issue of sound management. Given the right conditions, good managers produce good companies. Never invest in badly managed companies.

    The trouble, it seems, is that there are a great many poor managers. “The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate,” lamented Buffet in 1988, going on to criticize the comfortable conspiracies of too many boardrooms. “At board meetings, criticism of the CEO’s performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching.”

    Buffett believes that executives should think and behave as owners of their businesses. He is critical, therefore, of the “indiscriminate use” of stock options for senior executives. “Managers actually apply a double standard to options,” Buffet writes. “Nowhere in the business world are 10-year, fixed-price options on all or a portion of a business granted to outsiders. Ten months, in fact, would be regarded as extreme.”

    Such long-term options, argues Buffet, “ignore the fact that retained earnings automatically build value and, second, ignore the carrying cost of capital”.

    Buffett is a slow-moving minimalist in an age of hyperactive behemoths. In the Berkshire Hathaway boardroom, belches are welcomed.

    Copyright © 2000 FT Knowledge Limited

  • The Challenge

    The Challenge

    This entry is part 2 of 6 in the series Monte Carlo Simulation

     

    Whenever you take a decision where you can loose or gain something, value is at risk. Most decision makers want a situation where they maximize the value, and if everything goes wrong have a minimum of regret.

    Intuition based decisions are the most common type of decisions we make in our daily life, what we seem to forget is that the intuition is the sum of all our experiences gained through years of hard work and often at a high cost. So what seemed to be an easy decision might be the result of years of gathered information. The decision maker has in fact very little uncertainty since the information is known.

    When the decision involves other people that need to be convinced and the complexity is vast and the potential loss is bigger than the individual can bear other methods than intuition is required. This was the situation for the team in The Manhattan project building the first atomic bomb. They needed to know and they did not have the experience to know and there was no place to gather information.

    They had to take decisions with a great deal of uncertainty. In order to understand the risk involved in every single decision and the total risk, they needed a method to calculate the risk. Most decisions related to investments and business development does not face this huge challenge similar to The Manhattan project but the same method can be used.

  • Uncertainty – lack of information

    Uncertainty – lack of information

    This entry is part 3 of 6 in the series Monte Carlo Simulation

     

    Every item in a budget or a profit and loss account represents in reality a probability distribution. In this framework all items whether from the profit and loss account or from the balance sheet will have individual probability distributions. These distributions are generated by the combination of distributions from factors of production that define the item.

    Variance will increase as we move down the items in the profit and loss account. The message is that even if there is a low variance in the input variables (sales, prices, costs etc.) metrics like NOPLAT, Free Cash Flow and Economic Profit will have a much higher variance.

    The key issue is to identify the various items and establish the individual probability distribution. This can take place by using historical data, interviewing experts or comparing data from other relevant sources. There are three questions we need to answer to define the proportions of the uncertainty:

    • What is the expected value?
    • What is the lowest likely value?
    • What is the highest likely value?

    When we have decided the limits where we with 95% probability estimate the result to be within we then decide what kind of probability distribution is relevant for the item. There are several to choose among, but we will emphasize three types here.

    1. The Normal Distribution
    2. The Skewed Distribution
    3. The Triangular Distribution

    The Normal Distribution is being used when we have situations where there is a likeliness for a symmetric result. It can be a good result but has the same probability of being bad.

    The Skew Distribution is being used when it can occur situations where we are lucky and experience more sales than we expected and vice versa we can experience situations where expenditure is less than expected.

    The Triangular Distribution is being used when we are planning investments. This is due to the fact that we tend to know fairly well what we expect to pay and we know we will not get merchandise for free and there is a limit for how much we are willing to pay.

    When we have defined the limits for the uncertainty where we with 95% probability estimate the result to be within we can start to calculate the risk and prioritize the items that matters in terms of creating value or loss.

  • Risk – Exposure to Gain and Loss

    Risk – Exposure to Gain and Loss

    This entry is part 4 of 6 in the series Monte Carlo Simulation

     

    It is first when the decision involves consequences for the decision maker he faces a situation of risk. A traditional way of understanding risk is to calculate how much a certain event varies over time. The less it varies the minor the risk. In every decision where historical data exists we can identify historical patterns, study them and calculate how much they varies. Such a study gives us a good impression of what kind of risk profile we face.

    • Risk – randomness with knowable probabilites.
    • Uncertainty – randomness with unknowable probabilities.

    Another situation occurs when little or no historical data is available but we know fairly well all the options (e.g. tossing a dice). We have a given resource, certain alternatives and a limited number of trials. This is equal to the Manahattan project.

    In both cases we are interested in the probability of success. We like to get a figure, a percentage of the probability for gain or loss. When we know that number we can decide whether we will accept the risk or not.

    Just to illustrate risk, budgeting makes a good example. If we have five items in our budget where we have estimated the expected values (that is 50% probability) it is only three percent probability that all five will target their expectation at the same time.

    0.5^5 = 3,12%

    A common mistake is to summarize the items rather than multiplying them. The risk is expressed by the product of the opportunities.