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July 2009 – Strategy @ Risk

Month: July 2009

  • Selecting Strategy

    Selecting Strategy

    This entry is part 2 of 2 in the series Valuation

     

    This is an example of how S&R can define, analyze, visualize and help in selecting strategies, for a broad range of issues; financial, operational and strategic.

    Assume that we have performed (see: Corporate-risk-analysis) simulation of corporate equity value for two different strategies (A and B). The cumulative distributions are given in the figure below.

    Since the calculation is based on a full simulation of both P&L and Balance, the cost of implementing the different strategies is in calculated; hence we can directly use the distributions as basis for selecting the best strategy.

    cum-distr-a-and-b_strategy

    In this rater simple case, we intuitively find strategy B as the best; being further out to the right of strategy A for all probable values of equity. However to be able to select the best strategy from more complicated and larger sets of feasible strategies we need a more well-grounded method than mere intuition.

    The stochastic dominance approach, developed on the foundation of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility paradigm (Neumann, Morgenstern, 1953) is such a method.

    When there is no uncertainty the maximum return criterion can be used both to rank and select strategies. With uncertainty however, we have to look for the strategy that maximizes the firms expected utility.

    To specify a utility function (U) we must have a measure that uniquely identifies each strategy (business) outcome and a function that maps each outcome to its corresponding utility. However utility is purely an ordinal measure. In other words, utility can be used to establish the rank ordering of strategies, but cannot be used to determine the degree to which one is preferred over the other.

    A utility function thus measures the relative value that a firm places on a strategy outcome. Here lies a significant limitation of utility theory: we can compare competing strategies, but we cannot assess the absolute value of any of those strategies. In other words, there is no objective, absolute scale for the firm’s utility of a strategy outcome.

    Classical utility theory assumes that rational firms seek to maximize their expected utility and to choose among their strategic alternatives accordingly. Mathematically, this is expressed as:

    Strategy A is preferred to strategy B if and only if:
    EAU(X) ≥ EBU(X) , with at least one strict inequality.

    The features of the utility function reflect the risk/reward attitudes of the firm. These same features also determine what stochastic characteristics the strategy distributions must possess if one alternative is to be preferred over another. Evaluation of these characteristics is the basis of stochastic dominance analysis (Levy, 2006).

    Stochastic dominance as a generalization of utility theory eliminates the need to explicitly specify a firm’s utility function. Rather, general mathematical statements about wealth preference, risk aversion, etc. are used to develop decision rules for selecting between strategic alternatives.

    First order stochastic dominance.

    Assuming that U’≥ 0 i.e. the firm has increasing wealth preference, strategy A is preferred to strategy B (denoted as AD1B i.e. A dominates B by 1st order stochastic dominance) if:

    EAU(X) ≥ EBU(X)  ↔  SA(x) ≤ SB(x)

    Where S(x) is the strategy’s  distribution function and there is at least one strict inequality.

    If  AD1B , then for all values x, the probability of obtaining x or a value higher than x is larger under A than under B;

    Sufficient rule 1:   A dominates B if Min SA(x) ≥ Max SB(x)   (non overlapping)

    Sufficient rule 2:   A dominates B if SA(x) ≤ SB(x)  for all x   (SA ‘below’ SB)

    Most important Necessary rules:

    Necessary rule 1:  AD1B → Mean SA > Mean SB

    Necessary rule 2:  AD1B → Geometric Mean SA > Geometric Mean SB

    Necessary rule 3:  AD1B → Min SA(x) ≥  Min SB(x)

    For the case above we find that strategy B dominates strategy A – BD1A  – since the sufficient rule 2 for first order dominance is satisfied:

    strategy-a-and-b_strategy1

    And of course since one of the sufficient conditions is satisfied all of the necessary conditions are satisfied. So our intuition about B being the best strategy is confirmed. However there are cases where intuition will not work:

    cum-distr_strategy

    In this case the distributions cross and there is no first order stochastic dominance:

    strategy-1-and-2_strategy

    To be able to determine the dominant strategy we have to make further assumptions on the utility function – U” ≤ (risk aversion) etc.

    N-th Order Stochastic Dominance.

    With n-th order stochastic dominance we are able to rank a large class of strategies. N-th order dominance is defined by the n-th order distribution function:

    S^1(x)=S(x),  S^n(x)=int{-infty}{x}{S^(n-1)(u) du}

    where S(x) is the strategy’s distribution function.

    Then strategy A dominates strategy B in the sense of n-order stochastic dominance – ADnB  – if:

    SnA(x) ≤ SnB(x) , with at least one strict inequality and

    EAU(X) ≥ EBU(X) , with at least one strict inequality,

    for all U satisfying (-1)k U (k) ≤0 for k= 1,2,…,n. , with at least one strict inequality

    The last assumption implies that U has positive odd derivatives and negative even derivatives:

    U’  ≥0 → increasing wealth preference

    U”  ≤0 → risk aversion

    U’’’ ≥0 → ruin aversion (skewness preference)

    For higher derivatives the economic interpretation is more difficult.

    Calculating the n-th order distribution function when you only have observations of the first order distribution from Monte Carlo simulation can be difficult. We will instead use the lower partial moments (LPM) since (Ingersoll, 1987):

    SnA(x) ≡ LPMAn-1/(n-1)!

    Thus strategy A dominates strategy B in the sense of n-order stochastic dominance – ADnB  – if:

    LPMAn-1 ≤ LPMBn-1

    Now we have the necessary tools for selecting the dominant strategy of strategy #1 and #2. To se if we have 2nd order dominance, we calculate the first order lower partial moments – as shown in the graph below.

    2nd-order_strategy

    Since the curves of the lower moments still crosses both strategies is efficient i.e. none of them dominates the other. We therefore have to look further using the 2nd order LPM’s to investigate the possibility of 3rd order dominance:

    3rd-order_strategy

    However, it is first when we calculate the 4th order LPM’s that we can conclude with 5th order stochastic dominance of strategy #1 over strategy #2:

    5th-order_strategy

    We then have S1D5S2 and we need not look further since (Yamai, Yoshiba, 2002) have shown that:

    If: S1DnS2 then S1Dn+1S2

    So we end up with strategy #1 as the preferred strategy for a risk avers firm. It is characterized by a lower coefficient of variation (0.19) than strategy #2 (0.45), higher minimum value (160) than strategy#2 (25), higher median value (600) than strategy #2 (561). But it was not only these facts that gave us strategy #1 as stochastic dominant, because it has negative skewness (-0.73) against positive skewness (0.80) for strategy #2 and a lower expected value (571) than strategy #2 (648), but the ‘sum’ of all these characteristics.

    A digression

    It is tempting to assume that since strategy #1 is stochastic dominant strategy #2 for risk avers firms (with U”< 0) strategy #2 must be stochastic dominant for risk seeking firms (with U” >0) but this is necessarily not the case.

    However even if strategy #2 has a larger upside than strategy #1, it can be seen from the graphs of the two strategies upside potential ratio (Sortino, 1999):
    upside-ratio_strategythat if we believe that the outcome will be below a minimal acceptable return (MAR) of 400 then strategy #1 has a higher minimum value and upside potential than #2 and vice versa above 400.

    Rational firm’s should be risk averse below the benchmark MAR, and risk neutral above the MAR, i.e., they should have an aversion to outcomes that fall below the MAR . On the other hand the higher the outcomes are above the MAR the more they should like them (Fishburn, 1977). I.e. firm’s seek upside potential with downside protection.

    We will return later in this serie to  how the firm’s risk and opportunities can be calculated given the selected strategy.

    References

    Fishburn, P.C. (1977). Mean-Risk analysis with Risk Associated with Below Target Returns. American Economic Review, 67(2), 121-126.

    Ingersoll, J. E., Jr. (1987). Theory of Financial Decision Making. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

    Levy, H., (2006). Stochastic Dominance. Berlin: Springer.

    Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1953). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Sortino, F , Robert van der Meer, Auke Plantinga (1999).The Dutch Triangle. The Journal of Portfolio Management, 26(1)

    Yamai, Y., Toshinao Yoshiba (2002).Comparative Analysis of Expected Shortfall and Value-at-Risk (2): Expected Utility Maximization and Tail Risk. Monetary and Economic Studies, April, 95-115.

  • Two letters

    Two letters

    Dear S@R,

    I am not interested in the use of stochastic models, and particularly Monte Carlo simulations.  I believe that these approaches too often lead to underestimating risks of extreme events, by failing to indentify correlated variables, first order or second order variables, and correlations in sample populations. I believe that the use of these models carries an important responsibility in the way banks failed to address risks correctly.
    Best regards,
    NN

    Dear NN,

    We wholeheartedly agree on the errors you point out, especially for the banking sector. However this is per se not the fault of Monte Carlo simulation as a technique, but in the way some models has been implemented and later misused.

    We also have read the stories about bank risk managers (and modellers) forced by higher management to change important risk parameters to make further loans possible.

    We just do not relay only on normal variables with short slim tails and simple VaR calculations. For risk calculations we alternatively use shortfall and spectral risk, the latter to give progressively larger weights to losses that can be disastrous. This will be a topic in a future post on our Web site.

    However I beg to differ with you on the question of correlations. In my experience large correlation matrixs is a part of the problem you describe. Such correlation matrixs will undoubtedly contain spurious correlations giving false estimates of important relations. This is why we model all important relations, using the unexplained variance as a part of the uncertainty describing the problem under study – the company’s operations.

    Many claim that what killed Wall Street was uncritical use of David X. Li’s copula formula, where errors massively increase the risk of the whole equation blowing up (Salmon, 2009). We have therefore never used his work, relaying more on both B. Mandelbrot and Taleb Nasim’s views.

    As we se it, the use of copula’s formua was done to avoid serious statistical analysis and simulation work – which is what we do.

    If you should reconsider, we will be happy to meet with you to explain the nature of our work. To us nothing is better than a demanding customer.

    Best regards

    S@R

    References

    Salmon, Felix (2009,02,23). Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street. Wired Magazine, Retrieved 0702,2009, from http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/wp_quant?currentPage=all

  • When in doubt, develop the situation

    When in doubt, develop the situation

    Developing the situation is the common-sense approach to dealing with complexity. Both as a method and a mind-set, it uses time and our minds to actively build context, so that we can recognize patterns, discover options, and master the future as it unfolds in front of us (Blaber, 2008)

    In our setting ‘developing the situation’ is the process of numerically describing (modelling) the company’s operations taking into account input from all parts of the company; sales, procurement, production, finance etc. This again has to be put into the company’s environment; tax regimes, interest and currency rates, investors expected return and all other stake holders expectations.

    This is a context building process ending up with a map of the company’s operations giving clear roles and responsibilities to all departments and owners to each set of input data (assumptions).

    Without including uncertainty and volatility in both assumptions and data, this is however only a two dimensional map.  Adding the always present uncertainty gives us the third dimension and the option of innovation:

    … discovering innovative options instead of being forced to default to the status quo. Developing the situation optimizes our potential to recognize patterns and discover innovative options because it’s synergistic with how the human mind thinks and makes decisions (Blaber, 2008)

    Having calculated the cumulative probability distributions for key variable, new information is immediately available. Shape and localization tells us about underlying uncertainty and possible outcomes. Some distributions can be tweaked and some not. Characteristics of production like machine speed, error rates or the limit of air traffic movements are given and can only be changed over time with new investments. Other like sales, ebitda, profit etc. can be tweaked and in some cases even fine tuned by changing some of the exogenous variable or by introducing financial instruments or hedges etc.

    Planning for an uncertain future is a hard task, but preparing for it by adapting to the uncertainties and risk uncovered is well within our abilities – giving us:

    …  freedom of choice and flexibility to adapt to uncertainties instead of avoiding them because they weren’t part of the plan. Happenstance, nature, and human behaviour all interact within an environment to constantly alter the situation. No environment is ever static. As the environment around us changes, developing the situation allows us to maintain our most prized freedom: the freedom of choice – to adapt our thinking and decision-making accordingly (Blaber, 2008)

    Not all uncertainty represents risk of loss, but manifestations of opportunities given the right strategy, the means and will of implementation:

    … having the audacity to seize opportunities, instead of neglecting them due to risk aversion and fear of the unknown. Risk aversion and fear of the unknown are direct symptoms of a lack of context, and are the polar opposites of audacity. The way to deal with a fear of the unknown isn’t to avoid it by doing nothing … (Blaber, 2008)

    Pete Blaber’s book originally written on a totally different theme than ours can, as good books on strategy and hard earned experience from military planning, easily be adapted to our civilian purpose.

    References

    Blaber, P., (2008). The Mission, the Men, and Me. New York, Berkley Hardcover.